Paul Downes QC

Paul specialises in commercial law, and has specific expertise in banking and finance-related matters.

After taking Silk in 2010, his reputation as a tough, commercially-minded barrister has continued to grow.

Before coming to the Bar, Paul worked for Barclays Bank and was an assistant examiner for the Chartered Institute of Bankers. A direct understanding of the commercial and financial worlds means clients benefit from a practical and user-friendly approach. Paul has also acted as an expert witness overseas in relation to banking regulation in the UK, and is lead contributor to Butterworths LexisNexis Encyclopedia on Forms and Precedents.

Paul also handles general commercial litigation, international trade, media and entertainment, and professional negligence. He acts as an arbitrator in LMAA shipping disputes, commercial disputes and insurance disputes.

He is recommended as a leading silk for commercial dispute resolution in Chambers & Partners UK Bar 2019 and for Banking & Finance, Commercial Litigation, Financial Services and Fraud: Civil in Legal 500 2019. 

> view Paul's full profile 

paul.downes@quadranctchambers.com

Joseph England 

Joe practises in a wide range of commercial disputes.

Joe began his legal career qualifying as a solicitor at Allen & Overy LLP before transferring to the Bar. Joe spent the first year of his practice as the Judicial Assistant to Lord Sumption and Lord Wilson at the Supreme Court. He soon returned as counsel to the Supreme Court in Bank of Cyprus UK Limited v Menelaou [2015] UKSC 66.

Since starting practice in August 2013, Joe has been engaged, on a near full-time basis, in a major ICC oil and gas arbitration in London and Geneva, and subsequent related litigations, working and appearing with legal teams in Poland, The Netherlands, Ireland, Curaçao, Nigeria, Mauritius, Scotland, the US, London and Switzerland.

> view Joseph's full profile

joseph.england@quadrantchambers.com

It is well settled that, if a voyage charter contains a provision that the shipowner will proceed with all convenient speed or utmost despatch to a load port, and also gives a date of expected arrival or expected readiness to load at the load port, then the law imposes on the owner an absolute obligation to commence the voyage to the loading port at such time as it is reasonably certain that the vessel will arrive on or around the expected date. In effect, the shipowner is held to the estimated date of arrival or readiness to load which he has given in the charterparty. That was first settled by the Court of Appeal in Monroe Brothers Ltd v. Ryan [1935] 2 KB 28, and was followed by Devlin J. in Evera S.A. Commercial v. North Shipping [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 367. In those cases, the charterparties had specified a date when the Vessel could be expected to load. In The Myrtos [1984] 2 Lloyd’s 449, the principle was extended to a charterparty which had an expected time of arrival at the loadport rather than an expected readiness to load.

Monroe Brothers Ltd. v. Ryan also decided that the general exceptions clause in a voyage charterparty does not apply until the approach voyage to the load port has commenced. Therefore, if an excepted cause has prevented the owner from commencing the approach voyage by the relevant date, the owner is unable to rely upon the exception as relieving him from liability.

Facts

In the instant case, the charterparty was on an amended Shellvoy 5 form which provided that, subject to its terms, the Vessel was to perform her service with utmost despatch and proceed to the load port, but it did not contain an expected time of arrival or readiness to load. It did, however, give details of the anticipated timetable for completion of the voyage under the prior charter, on which the Vessel was currently engaged. Those details comprised the Vessel’s current position, and ETAs for transiting the Suez Canal, loading and then discharging at Antifer, all qualified “iagw/wp” (“if all going well/weather permitting”). The charterparty also contained a cancelling clause.

Whilst the Vessel was transiting the Suez Canal, she struck a submerged object, leading to serious flooding. Lengthy repairs were required. The charterers exercised their right under the cancelling clause, and terminated the charter. They also claimed damages, alleging that the owners were in breach for failing to commence the approach voyage to the load port.

The Issue

The question for the Court was whether, in the absence of any date for the Vessel’s expected time of arrival or readiness to load, there was nevertheless an absolute obligation to begin the voyage to the loading port and, if so, the point in time at which that absolute obligation took effect. It was common ground that the rule identified in Monroe v. Ryan (that the exceptions in the charterparty did not apply until the approach voyage had commenced) could not be challenged in the Court of Appeal, and therefore was presumed to be correct for these purposes. The owners were therefore unable to rely on those exceptions in relation to the incident.

Popplewell J. at first instance had decided that the ETAs contained in the charterparty relating to the performance of the Vessel’s current voyage were the equivalent of an expected time of arrival or readiness to load. Accordingly, he held that the owners were under an absolute obligation to commence the voyage to the load port at the end of a reasonable discharging period for the Vessel after the ETA given in the charterparty for final discharge at Antifer under the prior charter. He also held that, if it was wrong to use the ETA for discharge then, in the alternative, the owners were obliged to commence the approach voyage at a date when it would reasonable be expected that the Vessel could arrive by the cancelling date.

Before the Court of Appeal, the owners argued in summary that:          

a.   On a proper construction of the wording of the instant charterparty, the obligation to commence the approach voyage and proceed with “utmost despatch” could only attach when the Vessel had departed from the last discharging port, under the previous charter, and that, since she never did, the obligation in fact never arose. Therefore, the owners were not in breach. This followed from the absence of an expected time of arrival or readiness to load, and the fact that the obligation of utmost despatch was expressly made “subject to the terms of this charter”. The inclusion of the itinerary of expected dates for the previous charter made clear that the Vessel was performing a prior service before the voyage under the instant charterparty, which was underscored by the fact that these were qualified “bss iagw/wp”.

b.   The cancelling clause was irrelevant because it merely gave the charterer an option to cancel, without any right to claim damages.

The charterers argued that:

a.   The reasoning of Popplewell J. should be upheld, in that the inclusion of the itinerary for the previous charter showed that it was intended as an equivalent to a statement in respect of the time at which the Vessel was expected to arrive or be ready to load.

b.   Alternatively, the obligation to commence the approach voyage with the utmost despatch must at least arise at such time as it was reasonable to suppose that the vessel should sail to meet the cancelling date.

The Decision

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Popplewell J. Adopting the reasoning of Devlin J. in Evera, if the obligation to proceed with utmost despatch was to be given any effect at all, some time for sailing had to be put in. That meant that the Vessel had to proceed either “forthwith” at the date of the charter, or “within a reasonable time”. The inclusion of the itinerary showed that “forthwith” could not be meant. In Evera, Devlin J. had held that a shipowner was permitted to have recourse to the expected date of readiness to load. There was no particular magic in the concept of a date of expected readiness to load, and the itinerary for the prior charter was equally useable to enable the Court to decide what was the reasonable time at which the obligation of utmost despatch was to attach. The addition of the qualification “bss iagw/wp” was not merely intended to indicate that the Vessel was subject to a previous charter. It underscored that the itinerary consisted of estimates, given honestly and on reasonable grounds. If an owner wished to make the beginning of the chartered service contingent on the conclusion of the voyage under the previous charter, then much clearer words were required.

The Court therefore did not need to consider whether, in the absence of the itinerary under the prior charter, reliance could be put on the cancelling date. That was a question for another day.

Comment

This is an important decision, providing guidance on how the principles identified in Monroe v. Ryan are to be applied where there is no statement of the expected time of arrival or readiness to load at the load port. That is a not unfamiliar scenario in modern day voyage charters.

Where such statements are absent, the question in any particular case will be whether an equivalent can be identified, which the parties can be taken to have intended be used as the basis for an absolute obligation requiring the owners to proceed to the load port by a particular date. In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the itinerary for the voyage under the prior charter was just such an equivalent.

The owners are applying to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Simon Croall QC and Stewart Buckingham represented the owners, instructed by Michael Biltoo and Freddie Mehlig, Kennedys LLP, and John Russell QC represented the charterers, instructed by David Bennet, Harriet Defreyne Kelk, Clyde & Co LLP.

Simon Croall QC

Simon Croall QC is Head of Quadrant Chambers. He is an established commercial silk who has appeared in every court (including two recent appearances in the Supreme Court). He is a sought after trial advocate as well as being respected in the appellate courts. In recent years much of his work has been in the context of International Arbitrations.

He led the team for Owners in the landmark House of Lords case on remoteness in contract damages Transfield Shipping v Mercator Shipping ("The Achilleas") [2009] 1 AC 61. Recent reported highlights include another important case on damages Fulton Shipping v Globalia (The New Flamenco) in the Supreme Court [2017] UKSC 43, the Court of Appeal [2015] EWCA 1299 and below [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 230; The Longchamp [2018] UKSC 68 first reported English authority on the interpretation of Rule F of the York Antwerp Rules, arising in the context of ransom piracy payments; ST Shipping & Transport Pte Ltd v Space Shipping Ltd (“The CV Stealth”) [2018] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 276; [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 17(claims arising out of the detention of a vessel by Venezuelan authorities); Jiangsu Shagang Group v Loki Owning Group (“MV Pounda”) [2018] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 359 and Essar Shipping v Bank of China [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 427.

He also has a global practice with a depth of experience working with Chinese and south east Asian clients. This was recognised by his ranking as a leader in International Arbitration by Chambers Asia Pacific 2018 and Legal 500 Asia Pacific Guides. Simon was named one of the top 10 maritime lawyers of 2017 by Lloyd's List. Simon has been nominated for Shipping Silk of the Year at the Chambers & Partners Bar Awards 2018.

He is also a recommended as a leading silk Shipping and Commodities (Legal 500 UK and Asia Pacific, Chambers UK, Asia Pacific and Global editions), Energy (Legal 500 UK) and Information Technology (Chambers UK).

> view Simon's full profile

simon.croall@quadrantchambers.com

Stewart Buckingham

Stewart is a commercial barrister, specialising in commercial law, mainly focussing on commercial litigation and international arbitration. He has extensive trial, interlocutory and arbitration experience, and also undertakes advisory work and drafting. His takes a commercially driven approach tailored to the practical needs of his clients, and aims to deliver excellence in the services he provides. He is particularly adept at dealing with complex technical disputes.

He has been consistently ranked as a 'Leading Junior' in both the leading directories for several years. Comments have included:

"praised for his approachability and user-friendliness, and is further admired for his advocacy skills"; "a delight to work with"; "easily understandable advice and commercially minded, down-to-earth style" (Chambers UK).

‘A leading junior for many years now, he has a can-do attitude and a deep understanding of the legal and commercial issues.’ (The Legal 500).

> view Stewart's full profile

stewart.buckingham@quadrantchambers.com

John Russell QC

John is an experienced and determined advocate and has acted as lead Counsel in numerous Commercial Court trials, international and marine arbitrations and appellate cases, including in the Supreme Court. He relishes both detailed legal argument and cross-examination of lay and expert witnesses. He will always ensure that a client's case is presented in the most persuasive manner possible, both in writing and orally. John provides advice to a wide range of clients. He combines first rate technical legal analysis with a pragmatic, commercial, problem solving approach to cases. John accepts instructions in many fields of commercial dispute resolution with a particular focus on shipping, commodities, international trade and marine insurance.

“Very easy to work with and a very good litigator.” “An excellent advocate whose assessment of cases is invaluable.” (Chambers UK, 2019)
"He’s incredibly impressive, and is someone who always comes up with points that are insightful. He’s incredibly impressive, excellent on his feet and a joy to work with." (Chambers UK, 2018)
"...Particularly highly rated, he has a sharp mind and provides clear advice...." (Legal 500, 2017)
"The kind of barrister you would want to have on your side. He's not afraid to challenge anyone on anything." "He's bright, commercial, user-friendly and he delivers when you need it." (Chambers & Partners UK 2017)

> view John's full profile

john.russell@quadrantchambers.com

Related News:

In the summer we produced an extended version of the newsletter, which can be found here. 

The Claim

Mr Warner’s widow issued a claim against SFC alleging negligence and sought damages both as an individual and as guardian of their young son, Vincent, who had been born in November 2011. The claim was issued on 14th May 2015.

SFC lodged a defence that the action was time-barred under the Athens Convention, which, in the case of a death occurring during carriage, imposes a time bar of two years (and not the normal three years in English and Scots law) from the date on which the passenger would have disembarked.

At first instance (the Outer House), the widow’s claims both for herself and her son were struck out as time-barred. On appeal (before the Inner House) the widow’s claims for herself were held to be time-barred but those in respect of her infant son were held not to be time-barred.

The Issue

The issue was whether Scot’s law as the law of the forum could effect a period of “suspension” or “interruption” of a limitation period so as to permit the widow’s and the son’s claim to continue.

The Athens Convention

The Athens Convention has the force of law in the UK pursuant to section 183 and Schedule 6 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. It also applies to domestic UK sea carriage under  The Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (Domestic Carriage) Order 1987 (SI 1987/670). It does not need contractual incorporation albeit it can be contractually incorporated both intentionally and unintentionally.

Article 16 of the Athens Convention, provides:

(1) Any action for damages arising out of the death of or personal injury to a passenger or for the loss of or damage to luggage shall be time-barred after a period of two years.

(2) The limitation period shall be calculated as follows:

(a) in the case of personal injury, from the date of disembarkation of the passenger;

(b) in the case of death occurring during carriage, from the date when the passenger should have disembarked, and in the case of personal injury occurring during carriage and resulting in the death of the passenger after disembarkation, from the date of death, provided that this period shall not exceed three years from the date of disembarkation;

[…]

(3) The law of the court seized of the case shall govern the grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods, but in no case shall an action under this Convention be brought after the expiration of a period of three years from the date of disembarkation of the passenger or from the date when disembarkation should have taken place, whichever is later.

The parties were agreed that Mr Warner would have disembarked no later than 18 August 2012.

The Arguments

On its appeal, SFC argued that

(1)   The natural meaning of the words “grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods” in Article 16(3) was they they must be grounds which give rise to a break in a period or course of events which is already in train; and/or

(2)   The words “grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods” have a technical meaning derived from certain civil law systems, where a distinction was drawn between a “suspension” and an “interruption”.

a.      A “suspension” was said to refer to the situation in which a limitation period, which had started to run was paused by an event, such as the onset of mental incapacity, and then resumed its running when the incapacity ceases with the rest of the period remaining.

b.      An “interruption” was said to refer refers to a situation in which the limitation period, having been halted by an event, commences afresh when the halting event ceases and the time which has expired before the halting event does not count towards the running the limitation period.

Thus, SFC argued that a suspension or an interruption operates only if the limitation period had already begun to run before the pausing or halting event occurred. If that was right, then the Scots law of limitation enacted in section 18 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 did not contain such “grounds of suspension and interruption” as to extend the limitation period. This was because, section 18 of the 1973 Act only postponed the start of the limitation period instead of interrupting or suspending it as the Athens Convention envisages. Therefore the claim by the infant was time-barred by the two-year time bar.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court dismissed SFC’s appeal and held that the claim advanced on behalf of the minor son was not time-barred.

The Supreme Court, adopting an “uniform” and non-technical approach to the words “suspension and interruption” in Article 16(3) of the Athens Convention, held that

(1)   A “suspension” in its natural meaning could readily cover the postponement of the start of a limitation period

(2)   This was so even though there was a valid distinction between  a “suspension” and an “interruption” such that

a.      In an “interruption” of a prescription period which had been running, the period commences again as of new and the prior period is in effect cancelled.

b.      However in the case of a “suspension” if the prescription period has started to run, the running of time resumes at the point it was before the suspension so that the time which has passed before the suspension counts towards the prescription period.

The Supreme Court held that an interpretation of Article 16(3) which led to the conclusion that domestic rules which have the effect of postponing the start of a limitation period were of no effect would give rise to serious anomalies.

Many legal systems suspend the operation of prescription or limitation when a claimant is a minor or is subject to a recognised legal disability such as mental incapacity. If SFC were right, the Convention would recognise as a ground of suspension a legal incapacity which arose after the prescription or limitation period commenced, but rather oddly would not recognise such incapacity that predated the start of that period. Thus a minor born before the commencement of the prescription or limitation period could not take advantage of the added year for which article 16(3) provided but a minor born after the commencement of the period would benefit from that added year.

The Supreme Court, quite sensibly, held that the words “the grounds of suspension … of limitation periods” were sufficiently wide to cover domestic rules which postpone the start of a limitation period as well as those which stop the clock after the limitation period has begun.

However, in fact, section 18 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 did not in law postpone the start of a limitation period. If a Scottish Claimant’s legal disability predated the start of the limitation period, the Scottish provision simply instructed the court to disregard the time thereafter when the Claimant was under a legal disability. However the practical effect of the disregard on the calculation of the expiry of the three-year limitation period would be the same as a postponement of the start of the limitation period.

The Supreme Court held that even if the period of limitation was subject to a “suspension and interruption”  the limitation period imposed by Athens was nevertheless subject to the long stop in Article 16(3) “… of three years from the date … when disembarkation should have taken place …”. A domestic “suspension” provision could not defer the expiry of the Convention’s limitation period beyond that long stop.

Conclusion

This is a very sensible decision removing any difference of approach to a domestic limitation regime which might draw a distinction between a “suspension” and “limitation” and reflects English obiter dicta in Higham v Stena Sealink Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26. However the best advice remains: issue a claim within 2 years in a shipping case!

For a copy of the judgment click here. 

Jonathan Chambers

Jonathan has a broad practice covering all aspects of commercial and transport law.  

He is consistently ranked by Chambers UK and Legal 500 as a Leading Senior Junior, with Chambers UK (2018) commenting “A tenacious advocate with an admired intellectual capacity. His redoubtable practice focuses on complex cases involving personal injury and fatality”  and “He is easy to work with and responsive. He quickly identifies the issues”  and Chambers UK (2016) commenting that he is “Noted by peers for his meticulous preparation, strong advocacy skills and easy manner with clients” and Legal 500 (2016) describing him as “Very well prepared”

Jonathan has a strong international practice and he is qualified to practise in England & Wales, Northern Ireland (practising) and Australia (currently non-practising). He has also advised on disputes involving Australia, Canada, the Channel Islands, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Singapore, and the United States of America.

Jonathan has acted in disputes involving many of the major airlines, cruise and tour operators, UK airports and the CAA. He also acts on behalf of shipyards, ship-owners, rig owners, crewing agencies and shipping unions and the Royal Yachting Association. He is involved in a large volume of wet and dry shipping cases including cargo claims, pilotage, collisions and groundings. International ship-building, rig-construction and repair cases are also a strong feature of his practice.

He frequently acts in inquests involving aviation and maritime incidents and the civil claims which follow.

> click to view Jonathan's full profile

jonathan.chambers@quadrantchambers.com

Background

The dispute arose out of the shipment of a cargo of soyabeans on the MV PRIVOCEAN from New Orleans to China via the Panama Canal in November 2014. Owners’ claim was for a balance of about US$400,000 of hire. The master had required that the cargo in hold number 2 be strapped in order to ensure the stability of the ship in accordance with SOLAS (The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974).  This entailed the Charterers incurring additional expenditure of some US$ 410,000 which they counterclaimed from Owners by way of damages on the grounds that the strapping was unnecessary and that the master’s insistence upon it was negligent.

Charterers contended that their counterclaim should succeed on two principal grounds:

(1) That the wording of clause 2 of the NYPE 1946 form meant that an inference could be made that Owners should be liable for the cost of unnecessary strapping.

(2) That the Master’s negligence in ordering the strapping of cargo in hold number 2 meant that the cost of such strapping should be for Owners’ account.  Charterers argued that the stability of the vessel could have been ensured through other means, such as ballasting or distributing the cargo differently.    

The Tribunal’s Decision

The Tribunal found that the Master had indeed been negligent and that adequate stability could have been achieved without the need for strapping.  The negligence was found to have been a breach of clauses 8 and 83. 

However, the Tribunal found that the negligence of the Master was in the management of the ship. Accordingly Owners were not liable by reason of section 4(2) of US COGSA (as incorporated in the relevant charterparty) which is in the same terms as Article IV Rule 2(a) of the Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules.  Further, the Tribunal decided that clause 2 did not come to Charterers’ aid.

The High Court Claim

Permission was granted to Charterers to appeal the decision on two questions of law, namely:

(1) Is the effect of clause 2 of NYPE form 1946 edition that unnecessary and non-requisite fittings insisted upon by the Master are for the account of Owners?

(2) Where the primary purpose of  a loading and stowage operation is to put the cargo on board so that it can be carried to the discharge port, and where the Master negligently causes the cargo to be loaded and stowed in such a way that money and time are wasted by fitting and removing unnecessary cargo fittings, is the negligence of the Master in the management of the ship (within the meaning of section 4(2) of COGSA and Article 4, rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules), or the management of the cargo?

Cockerill J upheld the Tribunal’s decision on both questions.  The Judge concluded that in relation to the first question of law, clause 8, not clause 2 governed the parties’ obligations in respect of the loading and stowing of cargo.  The effect of clause 8 is “well known”, it is a broad transfer of responsibility of such operations to Charterers.  Without more any qualification for necessity as suggested by Charterers could not properly be read into clause 2. 

As to the second question of law, the Judge again started from the position that as per clause 8 of the charterparty the responsibility for loading had been transferred to Charterers.  The Master’s role in creating the stowage plan was, the Judge held, “supervisory and not primarily related to the care of the cargo”.  The Master’s actions in this regard were considered by the Judge as “pertaining to the stability of the vessel” and the Judge noted that the Master took the same view.  Thus the primary nature and object of the acts which caused the loss were related to ship management in the sense of the stability of the vessel and not the care of the cargo.  This was so despite the relevant acts affecting the cargo.  Thus the section 4(2) exception applied and excluded Owners from any liability.

Implications of the decision

This was an unusual case in that the counterclaim brought by Charterers in relation to which Owners sought to rely upon Article 4 rule 2 was not for damages for lost or damaged cargo, but rather for wasted costs. However, it was not suggested that the defence is limited to cases of physical loss or damage (see also in this regard The Aquacharm [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 at p. 10 per Lord Denning MR).

As with many such cases, the result will be very fact specific.  A relevant factor in this case was held by the Judge to be the timing of the acts complained of – the negligent act of refusing to contemplate a particular stowage plan predated any act of loading.  However, in a case such as this, it was not just the nature of the relevant act but the object of the act which determined the claim.  At first blush the strapping of the cargo would appear to be an act concerning the care of the cargo, but once the precise acts complained of and which caused the loss were identified and the object of the acts examined, it followed that the negligent acts related to the management of the vessel.  So the case shows that just because an act affects cargo, does not mean that it cannot be considered as being an act “in the management of the vessel”.

A copy of the draft judgment from the hearing is here. 

David Goldstone QC and Saira Paruk acted for Owners, instructed by Stuart Parkin, Waterson Hicks. John Passmore QC acted for Charterers, instructed by David Handley, Clyde & Co LLP

David Goldstone QC

David is a highly experienced barrister who has appeared in the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court and has acted for most of the UK`s leading commercial solicitors. He is now accepting appointments as arbitrator and mediator but also continues to advise clients across the full spectrum of commercial law, international trade and shipping.

David remains a leading barrister in the shipping sector and is ranked as a leading silk both by the Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners. Although he no longer acts as an advocate David brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to his advisory practice. He was "rightly rewarded with silk" (2007 Legal 500 - shipping) in 2006 and since then has gone from strength to strength. In recent years, he has been described as "a first-class brain who is exceptionally clever, analytical and incisive" (2007 Chambers UK - shipping and commodities), as "absolutely phenomenal", "runs rings around the opposition and can grasp complex issues exceptionally quickly" (2009 Chambers UK - Shipping and commodities) and as “outstanding” and “for some, the brightest man at the Bar” (2014 Legal 500). He is comfortable with technical cases including engineering, chemistry and related disciplines and is able to advise both in relation to wet and dry matters.

> view David's full profile

david.goldstone@quadrantchambers.com

Saira Paruk

Saira practises in all of Chambers’ key areas of work as both sole counsel and as a junior.

Saira regularly appears in the Commercial Court and in arbitrations in a wide range of commercial disputes including shipping, carriage of goods, shipbuilding, insurance and reinsurance, and private international law.  She also has extensive experience of interlocutory matters of all kinds including jurisdictional challenges, freezing orders and injunctions.

Saira’s recent reported cases include Polaris Shipping Co Ltd v Sinoriches Enterprises Co Ltd (The "Ocean Virgo") [2015] EWHC 3405 (Comm) successfully appealling an arbitration award, Carlos Soto SAU v AP Moller-Maersk A/S (The SFL Hawk) [2015] EWHC 458 (Comm) as sole counsel in a Commercial Court trial, Crowther & Another v Rayment & Another [2015] EWHC 427 (Ch) as sole counsel successfully resisting the appointment of an arbitrator.

> view Saira's full profile

saira.paruk@quadrantchambers.com

John Passmore QC

John Passmore QC has a commercial litigation and arbitration practice, involving a wide range of business sectors, with emphasis on aviation, banking, insurance, energy, commodities and derivatives, professional negligence, shipbuilding and offshore construction, and wet and dry shipping.

John is an experienced team-leader. His inclusive approach ensures that all members of the team, from the business, in-house counsel and partners, to associates, para-legals and trainees, as well as junior Counsel, can contribute to strategy and tactics.John deals with sale and purchase, charterparty, COA and bill of lading and COA disputes, in relation to all types of vessels and all types of cargoes. John also deals with collision and limitation claims, and all aspects of Admiralty practice and procedure such as general average, liens, arrest, judicial sale and priorities. 

"John is technically gifted and really grasps complex legal and factual claims, whilst understanding the commercial imperatives." (Chambers UK, 2018)

> view John's full profile

john.passmore@quadrantchambers.com

In addition to her legal work, Ania was the ICC YAF representative in the UK between 2012 and 2017, appointed to the ICC UK Committee for Arbitration and ADR in 2015 and has been Vice Chair of the committee since 2017. She was a member of the ICCA/Queen Mary Taskforce on Third Party Funding and Chaired the Sub-Committee on privilege. She is also Co-Chair of the International Arbitration Charity Ball Committee and on the organising committee for London Disputes Week.

On joining, Ania said: “I am delighted and honoured to have been invited to join the ranks of arbitrators at Arbitrators at 10 Fleet Street. Quadrant Chambers have already made me feel very welcome. I am particularly proud to be the first female arbitrator to join Arbitrators at 10 Fleet Street, and hopefully the first of many more.”

Ania joins fellow arbitrators Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Sir David Steel, David Steward and Richard Lionberger.

“Arbitrators at 10 Fleet Street" is a separate arbitrator wing set up by leading commercial disputes set Quadrant Chambers.

Ania Farren

> view Ania's profile

Simon Croall QC

Simon Croall QC is a commercial silk who has appeared in every court (including two recent appearances in the Supreme Court). He is a sought after trial advocate as well as being respected in the appellate courts. In recent years much of his work has been in the context of International Arbitrations.

Reported highlights include Fulton Shipping v Globalia (The New Flamenco) in the Supreme Court [2017] UKSC 43, [2017] 1 WLR 2581 (a leading case on the mitigation of loss); The Longchamp [2017] UKSC 68; [2018] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (the application of the York Antwerp Rules to modern piracy); Transfield Shipping v Mercator Shipping ("The Achilleas") [2009] 1 AC 61 (a landmark case on remoteness of loss), Rafaela S [2005] 2 AC 423 (another House of Lords appearance), AET Inc v Arcadia Petroluem (“The Eagle Valencia”) [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 257 (CA) and Mediterranean Salvage v Seamar [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 639 (CA) on implied terms.

He has a global practice with a depth of experience working with Chinese and South East Asian clients. This was recognised by his ranking as a leader in International Arbitration by Chambers Asia Pacific 2018 and Legal 500 Asia Pacific Guides. He is also recommended in the leading legal directories in the fields of commodities, energy, shipping and information technology. 

Simon Croall QC’s profile is available here.

Luke Parsons QC's profile is available here. 

Quadrant Chambers holds a pre-eminent position as a leading international commercial disputes set with a strong sector-driven approach. We are recommended in the UK, Asia-Pacific and Global legal directories and as a leading set in the fields of commercial dispute resolution, aviation, commodities, energy, insurance & reinsurance, international arbitration, shipping and travel. Quadrant has been shortlisted for Chambers of the Year 2018 at the British Legal Awards  and was named International Arbitration Set of the Year at the 2017 Legal 500 UK Awards .

The central issue on the appeal was whether the crossing rules (rules 15-17 of the Collisions Regulations (“ColRegs”) applied to the vessels’ encounter.  If they did, ES was the stand-on and A1 the give-way vessel.  The judge held, and the Court of Appeal (at [2018] EWCA Civ 2173) agreed, that they did not apply.  That was because –

• ES was subject to the narrow channel rule (ColReg rule 9) applied to ES and required that she keep to the starboard side of the channel. 
• That requirement is not the same as the requirement under rule 17 that the stand-on vessel maintain its course and speed.
• ES was out of its water at the start of the vessels’ encounter, having been allowed to drift to port of the centre line while dropping the pilot.  It was thus obliged to move to starboard under rule 9 and, if rule 17 applied, to maintain its course and speed.

The Appellant ES interests argued – and the Court of Appeal accepted ([63]) – that the requirement on the stand-on vessel is not to be interpreted literally or unthinkingly, but rejected the submission that there was no risk of inconsistent action being required by the two rules.  That being so, the two rules could not both apply and so rule 9 displaced rule 15.

Even if that was wrong, the Court upheld the judge’s finding that the vessels were not crossing, because A1 was not on a course (even though she was making way over the ground and the two vessels remained on a constant bearing throughout their encounter) but waiting for a pilot.  Thus the crossing rules did not apply in any event.

The Court also rejected the Appellant’s argument that the judge had misdirected himself on apportionment.  Here the issue concerned the proper treatment of the greater (and, as he held, unsafe) speed of ES in terms of causative potency: having held that there was not much to choose between the two vessels in terms of bringing about the collision, he “dialled up” the responsibility of ES because her higher speed was liable to do more damage.  That, said the Court, was correct in principle.  The guidance of Teare J. in the earlier case of The Nordlake [2016] 2 All ER (Comm) 449 was expressly approved (at [123]).

Finally, the Court dismissed A1’s cross-appeal.  A1 sought to argue that – even if the crossing rules did not apply – it did not have to give way, because it was picking up a pilot, or a “vessel constrained in her ability to manoeuvre” within the meaning of ColReg rule 18. 

The decision therefore provides important guidance on –

• The interplay between the crossing and narrow channel rules; and
• The correct approach to apportionment, particularly as regards the treatment of excessive speed.

Nigel Jacobs QC and James M. Turner QC appeared for the Appellant.

Nigel Jacobs QC

Nigel Jacobs QC is a specialist in shipping, insurance, commodity and commercial disputes. His appears both in the High Court and in arbitration. He is regularly instructed in (worldwide) freezing injunction, anti-suit injunctions and jurisdictional disputes.  His recent arbitrations include the termination of a substantial Middle Eastern joint venture and a successful challenge to the conclusion of a long-term charterparty. He is currently involved in an unsafe port case (South America) and a number of other casualties. He is also increasingly appointed as an arbitrator. 

"Very user-friendly and good on his feet." "He brings a strong intellect to the work. He’s very approachable and incredibly diligent." (Chambers UK, 2018)

..."He is very good on big-picture strategy, doesn’t micro-manage and is calm under pressure"... (Legal 500, 2017)

..."He did a fantastic job on his feet."... "He's very hard-working and good with juniors."... (Chambers UK 2016)

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nigel.jacobs@quadrantchambers.com

James M Turner

James M. Turner QC  is a specialist shipping and commercial advocate with over 20 years' experience right across those fields - from shipbuilding to collision and salvage; from unsafe port, bareboat and other charterparty disputes to demand guarantees, bills of exchange and letters of credit; from commodities to joint ventures. 

His experience as a team leader, stretching well back before taking silk, is in high-value, technical and expert-heavy cases, particularly involving shipbuilding contracts and charterparties.  He is valued for his technical knowledge and his ability to direct the collation of evidence. 

James appears regularly in the Admiralty and Commercial Courts and in arbitration in London. In addition, the international nature of his practice frequently takes him to continental Europe and to the Far East.

"a super advocate and a fantastic opponent"... "You know he will give you a good run for money" (Who's Who Legal, 2018)

"Tactically he’s very smart. He has strong analytical skills and a very good commitment to the cause." (Chambers UK, 2018)

"He’s good legally and also a good strategic thinker." (Chambers UK, 2018)

> View James' full profile
> james.turner@quadrantchambers.com